



# Torum Token Audit Report

Version 1.0.1

Serial No. 2021093000042023

Presented by Fairyproof

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**FAIRYPROOF**



# 01. Introduction

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This document includes the results of the audit performed by the Fairyproof team on the Torum token.

**Audit Start Time:**

September 29, 2021

**Audit End Time:**

September 29, 2021

**Token's Name:**

Torum

**Token's Symbol:**

XTM

**Token's Precisions:**

18

**Max Supply:**

800,000,000

**Token's Ethereum Address:**

0xCd1fAfF6e578Fa5cAC469d2418C95671bA1a62Fe

**Audited Source File's Address:**

<https://etherscan.io/address/0xcd1faff6e578fa5cac469d2418c95671ba1a62fe#code>

The goal of this audit is to review Torum's token issuance function, study potential security vulnerabilities, its general design and architecture, and uncover bugs that could compromise the software in production.

We make observations on specific areas of the code that present concrete problems, as well as general observations that traverse the entire codebase horizontally, which could improve its quality as a whole.

This audit only applies to the specified code, software or any materials supplied by the Torum team for specified versions. Whenever the code, software, materials, settings, environment etc is changed, the comments of this audit will no longer apply.

## — Disclaimer

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Note that as of the date of publishing, the contents of this report reflect the current understanding of known security patterns and state of the art regarding system security. You agree that your access and/or use, including but not limited to any associated services, products, protocols, platforms, content, and materials, will be at your sole risk.

The review does not extend to the compiler layer, or any other areas beyond the programming language, or other programming aspects that could present security risks. If the audited source files are smart contract files, risks or issues introduced by using data feeds from offchain sources are not extended by this review either.

Given the size of the project, the findings detailed here are not to be considered exhaustive, and further testing and audit is recommended after the issues covered are fixed.

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## — Methodology

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The above files' code was studied in detail in order to acquire a clear impression of how the its specifications were implemented. The codebase was then subject to deep analysis and scrutiny, resulting in a series of observations. The problems and their potential solutions are discussed in this document and, whenever possible, we identify common sources for such problems and comment on them as well.

The Fairyproof auditing process follows a routine series of steps:

1. Code review that includes the following
  - i. Review of the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Fairyproof to make sure we understand the size, scope, and functionality of the project's source code.
  - ii. Manual review of code, which is the process of reading source code line-by-line in an attempt to identify potential vulnerabilities.
  - iii. Comparison to specification, which is the process of checking whether the code does what the specifications, sources, and instructions provided to Fairyproof describe.
2. Testing and automated analysis that includes the following:
  - i. Test coverage analysis, which is the process of determining whether the test cases are actually covering the code and how much code is exercised when we run the test cases.

- ii. Symbolic execution, which is analyzing a program to determine what inputs cause each part of a program to execute.
- 3. Best practices review, which is a review of the source code to improve maintainability, security, and control based on the established industry and academic practices, recommendations, and research.

## — Structure of the document

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This report contains a list of issues and comments on all the above source files. Each issue is assigned a severity level based on the potential impact of the issue and recommendations to fix it, if applicable. For ease of navigation, an index by topic and another by severity are both provided at the beginning of the report.

## — Documentation

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For this audit, we used the following sources of truth about how the token issuance should work:

<https://intro.torum.com/>

<https://etherscan.io/address/0xcd1faff6e578fa5cac469d2418c95671ba1a62fe#code>

This was considered the specification.

## — Comments from Auditee

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No vulnerabilities with critical, high or medium-severity were found in the above source code.

One vulnerability with low-severity was found in the above source code.

## 02. About Fairyproof

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[Fairyproof](#) is a leading technology firm in the blockchain industry, providing consulting and security audits for organizations. Fairyproof has developed industry security standards for designing and deploying blockchain applications.

## 03. Major functions of audited code

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The audited code implements a token issuance function. Here are the details:

Name: Torum

Symbol: XTM

Precisions: 18

Max Supply: 800,000,000 , No appreciation

no extra charge in transactions

Misc: Protection of lp

Protection of lp: when lps are protected in a specified protection period, if a user transfers tokens, a third-party developed contract deployed at `0x79FAd89cA30B1b57246e34BDBD01dF7e0E50B09E` will be called to protect lps. **However this third-party developed contract was not covered by this audit, and was assumed to function and interact with the audited contract properly.**

**Attention: the protection for lps will expire after 11:59:59 PM GMT on September 30, 2021.**

## 04. Admin Rights

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The Admin has the following rights:

- enabling/disabling the protection for lps and setting addresses
- confiscating tokens that belong to locked addresses and unlocking locked addresses, when the protection for lps is effective
- The Admin will lose the above rights after the protection for lps expires

## 05. Key points in audit

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During the audit we reviewed possible vulnerabilities in token issuance and mainly did the following things:

## - Integer Overflow/Underflow

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We checked all the code sections, which have arithmetic operations and might introduce integer overflow or underflow if no safe libraries are used. All of them use safe libraries.

We didn't find issues or risks in these functions or areas at the time of writing.

## - Access Control

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We checked each of the functions that can modify a state, especially those functions that can only be accessed by "owner".

We didn't find issues or risks in these functions or areas at the time of writing.

## - Token Issurance

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We checked whether or not the contract files can mint tokens at will.

We didn't find issues or risks in these functions or areas at the time of writing.

## - State Update

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We checked some key state variables which should only be set at initialization.

We didn't find issues or risks in these functions or areas at the time of writing.

## - Asset Security

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We checked whether or not all the functions that transfer assets are safely handled.

We found a low risk. The existing implementation uses a third-party developed contract(service) to protect LPs. However this contract is not open source. Therefore it is possible that as long as an LP is judged as "illegal", the address that owns the LP will be locked and the XTM tokens this address owns are confiscated. For more details please refer to "04. Admin Rights".

**Note: when the protect for LPs expires, no addresses will be locked and no XTM tokens will be confiscated. This risk will no longer exist.**

## - Contract Migration/Upgrade

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We checked whether or not the contract files introduce issues or risks associated with contract migration/upgrade.

We didn't find issues or risks in these functions or areas at the time of writing.

## 06. Coverage of issues

The issues that the Fairyproof team covered when conducting the audit include but are not limited to the following ones:

- Re-entrancy Attack
- DDos Attack
- Integer Overflow
- Function Visibility
- Logic Vulnerability
- Uninitialized Storage Pointer
- Arithmetic Precision
- Tx.origin
- Shadow Variable
- Design Vulnerability
- Token Issurance
- Asset Security
- Access Control

## 07. Severity level reference

Every issue in this report was assigned a severity level from the following:

**Critical** severity issues need to be fixed as soon as possible.

**High** severity issues will probably bring problems and should be fixed.

**Medium** severity issues could potentially bring problems and should eventually be fixed.

**Low** severity issues are minor details and warnings that can remain unfixed but would be better fixed at some point in the future.

## 08. List of issues by severity

### A. Critical

- N/A

### B. High

- N/A

### C. Medium

- N/A

### D. Low

- Addresses Being Locked and Tokens Being Confiscated

## 09. Issue descriptions

- Addresses Being Locked and Tokens Being Confiscated:  
Low



The existing implementation uses a third-party developed contract(service) to protect LPs. However this contract is not open source. Therefore it is possible that as long as an LP is judged as "illegal", the address that owns the LP will be locked and the XTM tokens that the address owns will be confiscated. **However when the protect for LPs expires, no addresses will be locked and no XTM tokens will be confiscated. This risk will no longer exist.**



## 10. Recommendations to enhance the overall security

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We list some recommendations in this section. They are not mandatory but will enhance the overall security of the system if they are adopted.



- N/A

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